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Abstract 
 This paper points to the importance of prior beliefs in understanding the gap between 
decisions from experience and decisions from description. It puts forward a two-stage account 
that effectively incorporates prior beliefs into the examination of decisions from experience. 
The two-stage account assumes that (1) the subjective probabilities are estimated in a Bayesian 
manner, combining prior beliefs with observations, and (2) the estimated probabilities are 
transformed by probability weighting. The first stage provides a Bayesian explanation for the 
commonly found overestimation of infrequent outcomes, and an empirically appealing way to 
deal with always – or never – observed outcomes. A source dependent probability weighting in 
the second stage captures deviations from Bayesian rationality under experienced uncertainty. 
The two-stage model is tested by reanalyzing the data sets in Glöckner et al. (2016), as well as 
the famous Technion Prediction Competition data set of Erev et al. (2010). Model comparisons 
using BIC scores indicate that the two-stage model performs better than the single stage model 
approximating subjective probabilities with observed relative frequencies. The estimation 
results show that the two-stage model can accommodate both the classic and the reversed 
description – experience gap.  
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Introduction 
Early studies of decisions from experience (henceforth, DFE) suggested that people 
make choices as if they underweight the impact of rare outcomes. This empirical observation 
is inconsistent with the findings from traditional decisions from description (henceforth, DFD) 
and with the predictions of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992), the most prominent theory for risk and uncertainty. Since the influential 
studies by Barron & Erev (2003) and Hertwig et al. (2004) introducing the intriguing DFD-
DFE gap, an ever-growing DFE literature has clarified two main factors underlying the gap. 
First, under-observation of the rare outcomes in small samples, also known as the 
sampling error, is a major factor underlying the underweighting. This implies that observed 
relative frequencies of outcomes rather than the objective probabilities, which are unknown to 
the decision maker, should count in DFE (Fox & Hadar, 2006). Controlling for the sampling 
error, the DFD-DFE gap still amounts to relatively less overweighting, if not underweighting 
as it was claimed originally (Ungemach et al., 2009; Hau et al., 2009; Camilleri et al., 2009). 
The second factor concerns the information asymmetry between DFD and DFE (Hadar 
& Fox, 2009). Whereas DFD involves risk (known probabilities), DFE involves ambiguity due 
to incomplete information about the set of possible outcomes and probabilities. Importantly, 
the decision maker also lacks a priori knowledge about certainty or possibility of outcomes, 
which is relevant in the presence of always – or never – sampled outcomes. Several studies 
have shown that the gap is reduced or even reversed if the information asymmetry is reduced 
by providing information about the possible outcomes in prospects or by the absence of sure 
outcomes in choice problems (Abdellaoui, L'Haridon, & Paraschiv, 2011; Glöckner, Hilbig, 
Henninger, & Fiedler, 2016; Hadar & Fox, 2009; Kemel & Travers, 2016; Kellen, Pachur, & 
Hertwig, 2016). The recently found reversed DFD-DFE gap, implying even more pronounced 
overweighting of rare outcomes under DFE, is consistent with the previous literature on 
ambiguity (Abdellaoui, Vossmann, & Weber, 2005; Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, & Wakker, 
2011; Fox & Tversky, 1998; Fox, Rogers, & Tversky, 1996; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & 
Wakker, 1995). The decreased likelihood sensitivity under ambiguity is commonly attributed 
to the overestimation of infrequent outcomes due to sub-additive subjective beliefs or regression 
to the mean effects in probability estimations (Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994; Fiedler, 
Unkelbach, & Freytag, 2009; Fiedler & Unkelbach, 2014; Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; 
Tversky & Koehler, 1994). 
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This paper points to the role of prior beliefs as another important factor in the DFD-DFE 
gap. Except a few studies eliciting introspective judged probabilities (Hau et al. 2008; Camilleri 
& Newell 2009; Ungemach et al. 2009), the previous studies usually approximate subjective 
probabilities with observed relative frequencies neglecting the role of prior beliefs. However, 
the importance of the subjective prior beliefs is particularly evident in the face of the ambiguous 
nature of DFE because every subject brings his own prior expectations about the experimental 
setting into the laboratory. For example, even though not specified explicitly, a subject can 
reasonably anticipate the range of possible outcomes, and predict that extreme losses or gains 
do not occur very frequently due to ethical reasons or the budgetary constraints of the 
experimenter. The ecological rationality account of Pleskac & Hertwig (2014) illustrates the 
importance of such intuitions under ambiguous situations. If prior beliefs are not incorporated 
into the analysis of subjective probabilities, then the estimations of probability weighting may 
be confounded because the impact of prior beliefs will incorrectly be modeled through 
probability weighting. 
This study puts forward a more complete account of subjective probabilities under DFE, 
which involves a combination of prior beliefs with observed relative frequencies. As a working 
hypothesis, the present account proposes a Bayesian updating method for the estimation of 
subjective probabilities. Notably, the Bayesian updating of an ignorance prior will estimate the 
probability of an infrequent outcome higher than its observed relative frequency. This gives a 
rational basis for the regressions to the mean effects in probability estimations, also documented 
in the previous DFE studies eliciting judged probabilities.  
Hence, I introduce a two-stage decision model for DFE according to which (1) 
subjective probabilities are estimated using a Bayesian updating method developed by Rudolf 
Carnap (1952); (2) and the estimated probabilities are transformed using prospect theory’s rank- 
and sign-dependent probability weighting (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Besides being a 
normative method for belief updating, Carnap’s method, introduced in the next section, is also 
psychologically natural. Following the source method of Abdellaoui et al. (2011), the 
probability weighting in the second stage captures deviations from Bayesian rationality, and it 
is assumed to be source dependent. This means that having revealed the subjective probabilities, 
the model allows for different attitudes towards described and experienced probabilities 
observable through different probability weightings. It should be noted that the current model 
differs from the two-stage model of Tversky & Fox (1995) and Fox & Tversky (1998), which 
attributes ambiguity attitudes to sub-additive beliefs under uncertainty. Another distinguishing 
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feature of the current account is that it adheres to the revealed preference approach of 
(behavioral) economics by relying on choice-based probabilities rather than introspective 
probability judgments.         
The two-stage model is empirically tested by reanalyzing the data sets of Glöckner et 
al. (2016), as well as the Technion Prediction Competition data set of Erev et al. (2010).  As 
will be illustrated later, the model successfully disentangles the role of beliefs from preferences 
in DFE. Accordingly, the reversed DFD-DFE gap in probability weighting is estimated to be 
considerably smaller when prior beliefs are controlled for. Moreover, the classic DFD-DFE gap 
is also reduced, or even reversed, under some plausible assumptions on subject’s prior 
expectations about the set of possible outcomes. Overall, the robust likelihood insensitivity 
under DFE suggests further deviations from Bayesian rationality due to ambiguity. Lastly, 
model comparisons based on Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) scores also indicate that the 
two-stage model performs better than the single stage approach using observed relative 
frequency approximation of subjective probabilities. Thus, the two-stage model provides a 
parsimonious way to analyze DFE by adding only one extra parameter to the preceding models. 
Carnap’s Updating Method and the two-stage Model 
The current paper makes use of the inference method that Rudolf Carnap1 put forward to 
quantify the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis stating that the next observation from a 
population will be the outcome 𝑥𝑖 based on the evidence that a previous sample of 𝑁 
observations contains 𝑛𝑖 observations from the outcome 𝑥𝑖:  
𝑝𝑖 =
𝑐𝑝𝑖
0 + 𝑁
𝑛𝑖
𝑁
𝑐 + 𝑁
  . 
Thus, as in every Bayesian approach, the method combines a prior probability 𝑝𝑖
0 of the 
outcome 𝑥𝑖  with the observed relative frequency 
𝑛𝑖
𝑁
. The respective weights are proportional to 
a constant 𝑐 > 0 and the total number of observations 𝑁. The prior probability 𝑝𝑖
0 together with 
the constant 𝑐 represent the complete prior knowledge of the decision maker. A common 
intuitive interpretation is that the prior knowledge of the decision maker can be thought to be 
roughly equivalent to a hypothetical sample consisting of 𝑐 observations with relative 
                                                          
1 Rudolf Carnap is a well-known philosopher of science who also contributed to the theory of probability by 
providing a logical definition of probability (Carnap, 1945; 1950; 1952). Briefly, his theory views probability as a 
logical relation between two statements, namely the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis h on the evidence 
e (Carnap, 1945, p. 72), which is analogous to the concept of the degree of belief in the theory of subjective 
probability. 
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frequency 𝑝𝑖
0. In Bayesian inference, the method is also known from the updating of the 
conjugate beta family and the conjugate Dirichlet family for its multinomial extension 
(Winkler, 1972; Wilks, 1962; Zabell, 1982).  
  Carnap’s method is empirically appealing. First, the posterior probability of an outcome 
always lies between the prior and the observed relative frequency. The estimation converges to 
the relative frequency as more and more observations are accumulated, reflecting increasing 
confidence in empirical probabilities. In the case where there are two possible outcomes, a “flat” 
prior representing ignorance is captured by 𝑝𝑖
0 =
1
2
 and 𝑐 = 2, which turns the formula into the 
posterior mean of a uniform beta prior (Winkler, 1972). This case is illustrated in Figure 1. The 
posterior estimations tend to the 50/50 prior especially when the number of observations is 
small. This tendency reduces significantly as the number of observations increases from 5 
to 40. 
Second, the method reduces to relative frequency when 𝑐 converges to 0. Carnap (1945, 
p. 86) points out the major problem of using relative frequencies in estimations of probabilities 
concerning always – or never – observed outcomes. This problem is also commonly 
encountered in DFE experiments. In particular, assigning 1 or 0 probability to these outcomes 
may be implausible. A famous historical example of this issue is Laplace’s (1825) sunrise 
problem, asking the likelihood of the sun rising tomorrow. Laplace’s rule of succession for 
dealing with the problem, 𝑝𝑖 =
1+𝑁
2+𝑁
, is simply the restricted version of Carnap’s method under 
ignorance illustrated in Figure 1.2 For example, the method results in 𝑝𝑖 =
1+10
2+10
=
11
12
≅ 92% 
when the observed relative frequency is 10/10. The posterior estimation converges to certainty 
when 𝑁 increases.  
Carnap (1952) justifies the appropriateness of the method by providing logical axioms 
for it. Wakker (2002) presents the axioms in a decision theoretic context, and highlights the 
normative status of the method. The first property is positive relatedness of the observations. It 
means that an extra observation from an outcome only increases its likelihood. The second 
property is exchangeability. It means that only the number of observations from the outcomes 
matters, regardless of the order of observations. The third property is disjoint causality. It means 
that there is no causal relationship between different outcomes. Therefore, the probability of an 
outcome 𝑥𝑖 depends only on the number of observations of itself (𝑛𝑖) and of not-itself (𝑁 −
𝑛𝑖), regardless of which other outcomes were observed among the (𝑁 − 𝑛𝑖) other outcomes.     
                                                          
2 A historical review of the rule of succession is in Zabell (1989). 
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Figure 1. Posterior estimations with Carnap’s method when pi
0 =
1
2
 and c = 2 
      
In principle, Carnap’s properties are applicable to the DFE experiments, where the 
sample information is obtained from a fixed outcome distribution with replacement, i.e. from a 
stationary and independent process. It is worth noting that the properties can be violated due to 
subjects’ unjustified beliefs about the random processes and the cognitive illusions such as the 
hot hand and gambler’s fallacies (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; 
Ayton & Fischer, 2004; Sundali & Croson, 2006). However, these effects have been mainly 
documented in repeated settings such as in feedback paradigms of DFE (Barron & Yechiam, 
2009) and in probability matching tasks (Sundali & Croson, 2006) but not in the sampling 
paradigm, where the observations are made only for the purpose of information acquisition.   
Having constructed beliefs using Carnap’s method, the two-stage model assumes that 
prospects are evaluated by prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) in the second stage. 
In what follows, I denote a prospect with outcomes 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛 with respective 
probabilities 𝑝1, … , 𝑝𝑛 by (𝑝1: 𝑥1, … , 𝑝𝑛: 𝑦𝑛). The prospect theory value of an experienced 
prospect with 𝑥1 > ⋯ > 𝑥𝑘 > 0 > 𝑥𝑘+1 > ⋯ > 𝑥𝑛 is 
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𝑃𝑇(𝑝1: 𝑥1, … , 𝑝𝑛: 𝑥𝑛)
= ∑ 𝑢(𝑥𝑖)
𝑘
𝑖=1
[𝑤𝑒
+(𝑝𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝑝1) − 𝑤𝑒
+(𝑝𝑖−1 + ⋯ + 𝑝1)]
+ ∑ 𝑢(𝑥𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=𝑘+1
[𝑤𝑒
−(𝑝𝑗 + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑛) − 𝑤𝑒
−(𝑝𝑗+1 + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑛)]. 3                
The utility 𝑢(. ) is strictly increasing and continuous with 𝑢(0) = 0. The probability 
weighting functions 𝑤𝑒
𝑠(.) for gains (𝑠 = +) and losses (𝑠 = −) are strictly increasing with 
𝑤𝑒
𝑠(0) = 0 and 𝑤𝑒
𝑠(1) = 1. Here, the subscript 𝑒 designates the experienced source of 
ambiguity. Specifically, 𝑤𝑒
∓(.) measures the weighting of subjective probabilities under DFE. 
Prospects under DFD are similarly evaluated by prospect theory, where 𝑤𝑒
∓(.) is replaced 
by 𝑤∓(. ) measuring the weighting of objective probabilities. Hence, different attitudes towards 
experienced ambiguity and described risk can be captured by differences between 𝑤𝑒
𝑠(.) 
and 𝑤𝑠(. ).   
Testing the two-stage Model 
The following sections provide an empirical test of the two-stage model by parametric 
estimations of the prospect theory components under the two-stage model. I use Goldstein & 
Einhorn’s (1987) two-parameter family for probability weighting, and the commonly used 
power family for utility. The choice probabilities are calculated using the stochastic logit rule.  
 
𝑤+(𝑝) =
𝛿+𝑝𝛾
+
𝛿+𝑝𝛾+ + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾
+ 
𝑤−(𝑝) =
𝛿−𝑝𝛾
−
𝛿−𝑝𝛾− + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾
− 
𝑢(𝑥) = {
  𝑥𝛼            𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−𝑥)𝛽 𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 0 
 
𝑝(𝐴, 𝐵) =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝜎(𝑃𝑇(𝐴)−𝑃𝑇(𝐵))
 
  
The parameter 𝛿∓ determines the elevation of probability weighting, and measures the 
pessimism/optimism of the decision maker. Higher 𝛿∓ leads more elevation, and thus more 
optimism in the gain domain and more pessimism in the loss domain. The parameter 𝛾+/− 
                                                          
3 Here 𝑝𝑖−1 + ⋯ + 𝑝1 = 0 when 𝑖 = 1, and 𝑝𝑗+1 + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑛 = 0 when 𝑗 = 𝑛. 
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determines the curvature of the probability weighting function and it captures sensitivity 
towards probabilities. For, 𝛾+/− < 1 the probability weighting is inverse S-shaped reflecting 
likelihood insensitivity. The parameter 𝜆 determines the degree of loss aversion. To avoid extra 
complexity, utility curvature in the gain and in the loss domain is assumed to be the same by 
constraining 𝛼 = 𝛽. This assumption avoids an identification problem in the estimation of loss 
aversion (Wakker, 2010, section 9.6), and it is empirically supported by previous findings 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). For 𝛼, 𝛽 < 1, the utility curve is concave in the gain domain and 
it is convex in the loss domain. Lastly, the parameter 𝜎 in the logit formula determines the 
sensitivity to differences in prospect theory values of prospects. 
Three different cases of subjective priors are considered in the estimations. The first 
case assumes symmetric prior probabilities, 𝑝𝑖
0, equally distributed over all the outcomes that 
are believed to be possible in a prospect, and the constant 𝑐 in Carnap’s formula is treated as a 
free parameter to be estimated together with the other parameters. Hereafter, this will be called 
the Carnap prior case. The second case concerns the ignorance prior that was already 
mentioned in the previous section. The ignorance prior is a special case of the Carnap prior 
case. It assumes that the prior knowledge of the subject is equivalent to a hypothetical sample 
that contains one and only one observation from each of the possible outcomes. For instance, 
for a prospect with 𝑘 possible outcomes, the prior probability of every outcome is 
1
𝑘
 and 𝑐 = 𝑘. 
The third case suppresses prior beliefs altogether and simply approximates subjective 
probabilities with observed relative frequencies. In other words, this is Carnap’s method 
with 𝑐 = 0. Following the Bayesian terminology, this case will be called the diffuse prior 
(Winkler, 1972, p. 178). This case has been commonly used in the previous DFE studies.  
The maximum likelihood estimations are done using the estimation routine in STATA 
software described by Harrison (2008). Standard errors are cluster-corrected at the individual 
subject level. Model comparisons are based on BIC scores. 
 
Accounting for the reversed DFE-DFD gap: A reanalysis of Glöckner et al. (2016) with 
the two-stage model 
Glöckner et al. (2016) finds the reversed DFD-DFE gap based on an analysis of four 
experimental data sets. The authors mainly attribute the results to regression to the mean effects 
in probability estimations due to noise and reduced evaluability under uncertainty. But they also 
point out the possibility of an alternative explanation with updating of ignorance priors in a 
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footnote (footnote 8, p. 490). This section tests this alternative explanation by re-examining the 
four data sets using the two-stage model. The data sets are made available by the authors at 
Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/d9f8q/. 
Data  
The first data set is obtained from a previous study by Glöckner, Fiedler, Hochman, Ayal, & 
Hilbig (2012). The second and the third data sets are based on the Experiments 1 and 2 in 
Glöckner et al. (2016). These experiments replicate the experiment by Glöckner et al. (2012) 
with slight procedural variations. The choices concern only the gain domain in these three data 
sets.  The fourth data set is based on Experiment 3 in Glöckner et al. (2016). This data set 
contains choices in the gain, loss, and mixed domains.  In all the data sets, either all or the 
majority of the problems involve a choice between two two-outcome prospects, whereas the 
rest involves a choice between a two-outcome prospect and a sure outcome. Subjects in DFE 
conditions were informed about the number of possible outcomes in prospects, except half of 
the subjects in Experiment 2. There were no differences observed due to the information 
provision in this data set. Readers are referred to Glöckner et al. (2016) for more details on the 
experimental design.  
Results  
The estimation results are in Table 1. The last column reports the estimation results with the 
pooled data set. The resulting probability weighting functions are in Figure 2. The estimations 
under DFE using the diffuse prior indicate a significant DFD-DFE gap with respect to the 
likelihood sensitivity parameters 𝛾+/−. In all data sets, there is less likelihood sensitivity in the 
DFE condition than in the DFD condition. The gap is reduced under the two-stage model using 
the ignorance prior. In particular, the gap turns insignificant in the estimations based on the 
data sets of Glöckner et al. (2012) and Experiment 1, and in the gain domain of Experiment 3. 
However, the gap is never fully closed quantitatively. Thus, it is also significant in the 
estimations with the pooled data due to increased statistical power. 
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Table 1. Estimation results with the data sets in Glöckner (2016) 
Notes: Stars indicate DFD – DFE gap. * 𝑝 < 0.05. ** 𝑝 < 0.01. *** 𝑝 < 0.001.  
 
  
Glöckner et 
al. (2012) 
Experiment 
1 
Experiment 
2 
Experiment 
3 
Pooled 
𝛼 
DFD 0.652 1.058 0.617 0.954 0.850 
DFE – Diffuse prior 0.642 0.853 0.925* 0.991 0.796 
DFE – Ignorance prior 0.644 0.871 0.941* 0.981 0.800 
DFE – Carnap prior  0.621 0.890 0.949** 0.972 0.801 
𝑐 
DFD - - - - - 
DFE – Diffuse prior 0 0 0 0 0 
DFE – Ignorance prior 2 2 2 2 2 
DFE – Carnap prior  -1.602*** 6.456 3.603 10.117 2.768 
𝛿+ 
DFD 0.553 0.320 0.695 0.637 0.511 
DFE – Diffuse prior 0.561 0.392 0.482 0.661 0.541 
DFE – Ignorance prior 0.565 0.386 0.478 0.673 0.542 
DFE – Carnap prior  0.551 0.376 0.475 0.684 0.542 
𝛾+ 
DFD 0.732 0.736 0.961 0.559 0.810 
DFE – Diffuse prior 0.560* 0.552* 0.553*** 0.423* 0.536*** 
DFE – Ignorance prior 0.670 0.684 0.665*** 0.502 0.645*** 
DFE – Carnap prior  0.425** 0.919 0.740 0.733 0.682 
𝛿− 
DFD    1.074 1.091 
DFE – Diffuse prior    1.211 1.341 
DFE – Ignorance prior    1.243 1.357 
DFE – Carnap prior     1.288 1.361 
𝛾− 
DFD    0.856 0.787 
DFE – Diffuse prior    0.462*** 0.371*** 
DFE – Ignorance prior    0.544** 0.443** 
DFE – Carnap prior     0.793 0.467* 
𝜆 
DFD    1.001 1.237 
DFE – Diffuse prior    0.916 1.068 
DFE – Ignorance prior    0.917 1.081 
DFE – Carnap prior     0.920 1.084 
𝜎 
DFD 2.117 0.639 2.123 1.512 1.099 
DFE – Diffuse prior 2.045 0.865 0.791* 1.268 1.232 
DFE – Ignorance prior 1.997 0.825 0.758* 1.308 1.218 
DFE – Carnap prior  2.180 0.778 0.740* 1.326 1.212 
𝑁 
DFD 1298 1417 3180 2484 8379 
DFE  1283 1632 2912 2585 8412 
𝐿𝐿 
DFD -585.502 -659.720 -1547.839 -1312.611 -4225.120 
DFE – Diffuse prior -558.414 -774.531 -1296.291 -1340.263 -4056.058 
DFE – Ignorance prior -561.825 -772.261 -1290.621 -1335.877 -4048.111 
DFE – Carnap prior  -555.063 -771.387 -1289.894 -1332.834 -4047.754 
BIC 
DFD 1199.678 1348.465 3127.936 2679.945 8513.475 
DFE – Diffuse prior 1145.456 1578.653 2624.488 2735.529 8175.377 
DFE – Ignorance prior 1152.279 1574.111 2613.149 2726.755 8159.483 
DFE – Carnap prior  1145.911 1579.762 2619.67 2728.528 8167.807 
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The estimations under the two-stage model demonstrate further reductions of the gap 
when the Carnap prior is used. In this case, the gap disappears in all data sets except in the data 
set of Glöckner et al. (2012). Surprisingly, Carnap’s 𝑐 is found significantly negative in this 
data set. This result resembles to representativeness in probability updating where too much 
weight is assigned to the relative frequencies at the expense of prior probabilities (Grether, 
1980; Griffin & Tversky, 1992). As the negative 𝑐 induces underestimation of rare outcomes, 
the reversed gap is more pronounced here. In the rest of the estimations, the constant 𝑐 is 
estimated positive although not significantly different than 0. The estimations with the pooled 
data set indicates 𝑐 > 0 (𝑝 = 0.08), and the gap is accommodated in the gain domain. 
 
Figure 2. Probability weighting functions based on the pooled data set of Glöckner et al. 
Notes: Solid black lines show probability weighting under DFD. Dashed blue lines show probability 
weighting under DFE when the diffuse prior is used. Dotted red lines show probability weighting under 
DFE when the ignorance prior is used. Dot-dash green lines show probability weighting under DFE 
when the Carnap prior is used. 
 
 
The comparisons of the BIC scores indicate that the two-stage model account for the 
data at least as good as the model based on the diffuse prior. In particular, the two-stage model 
with ignorance priors outperforms the models with diffuse and Carnap priors, except for the 
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data set of Glöckner et al. (2012). Overall, the results confirm the ability of the two-stage model 
to explain the reversed DFD-DFE gap, although a residual gap still remains in probability 
weightings as shown in Figure 2.  
 
Accounting for the classic DFE-DFE gap: A reanalysis of Erev et al. (2010) with the two-
stage model 
The ambiguity in DFE is augmented when the set of possible outcomes is unknown. Whereas 
the ambiguity due to unknown probabilities can be easily studied in a tractable manner as 
illustrated in the previous section, the additional ambiguity about the outcome space poses a 
more complex problem to deal with. In particular, the subject’s prior beliefs about the 
ambiguous set of outcomes are not easily observable. This section first introduces some 
plausible assumptions about prior beliefs under such ambiguous situations to explain the classic 
DFD-DFE gap. Then, the assumptions are empirically tested under the two-stage model by 
reanalyzing the Technion choice prediction competition data set of Erev et al. (2010).    
 
Prior beliefs over ambiguous outcome space 
Here, I describe two hypothetical scenarios about possible considerations in a subject’s mind. 
The first is called context-dependent expectations, and it was put forward by Glöckner et al. 
(2016). To illustrate, consider the following choice problem under DFD involving two options: 
Option A is a sure outcome 8.7 and Option B is a risky prospect with (0.91: 9.6, 0.09: −6.4) 
(taken from figure 3 in Glöckner et al.). Under DFE, the subject does not know the number of 
possible outcomes in the options, and therefore she is not aware of the certainty of the outcome 
8.7 that she observes from Option A successively. Glöckner et al. (2016) argues that while 
forming beliefs about an option, the subject will not only use the information that she sampled 
from the very same option but also the information that she gathered from the other option. 
Accordingly, the rare outcome observed from Option B may be projected upon Option A. 
Specifically, the experience of the rare outcome −6.4, along with the common outcome 9.6 in 
Option B, can create an expectation that a similarly bad and rare outcome also exists in Option 
A. Thus, her updated belief about Option A makes it less attractive, and therefore she may 
prefer Option B. Notably, this gives the impression that she is underweighting the small 
probability of −6.4 in Option B, although in fact the choice is due to her prior beliefs. 
More specifically, suppose that the subject updates her beliefs according to Carnap’s 
method, and she uses an ignorance prior.  Furthermore, she makes 10 observations from the 
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each option, and observes the outcome −6.4 only once. The relative frequency approximation 
of her subjective beliefs falsely implies that she is making a choice between the sure outcome 
(
10
10
: 8.7) and the risky prospect (
9
10
: 9.6,
1
10
: −6.4), whereas she is indeed making a choice 
between a perceived (
11
12
: 8.7,
1
12
: ~ − 6.4) and (
10
12
: 9.6,
2
12
: −6.4) as implied by context 
dependent expectations and Carnap’s updating method.  
The second scenario is a natural extension of the context-dependent expectations. It 
assumes that the subject will have more comprehensive beliefs by expecting that any outcome 
that she is aware of within a given problem can in principle exist in both options. Hence, this 
scenario will be called comprehensive expectations. Continuing with the previous example, it 
leads to a choice between 𝐴: (
1
13
: 9.6,
11
13
:  8.7,
1
13
: −6.4) and 𝐵: (
10
13
: 9.6,
1
13
: 8.7 ,
2
13
: −6.4), 
where the probabilities are calculated based on the Carnap’s method with 𝑝𝑖
0 =
1
3
 and 𝑐 = 3. 
This scenario has a less clear prediction for the attractiveness of the sure prospect. In the present 
problem, adding good and bad outcomes, 9.6 and −6.4, to the Option A will impact its 
attractiveness depending on the relative steepness of the lower parts of the probability weighting 
curves in the gain and in the loss domains. For instance, more overweighting of 
1
13
 in the loss 
domain than in the gain domain decreases the attractiveness.  
In the following analysis, the perceived set of possible outcomes is constructed based 
on the context-dependent or comprehensive expectations. Then, the parametric estimations will 
be done under the two stage model by using Carnap, ignorance and diffuse priors.  
 
Data  
I focus on the DFD and DFE sampling conditions in Erev et al. (2010). The study consists of 
an estimation data set and a competition data set. The two data sets are pooled in the current 
analysis. The pooled data set contains 40 subjects in the DFD condition and 80 subjects in the 
DFE condition. Each subject makes 60 choices in the DFD condition and 30 choices in the DFE 
condition. The problems always involve a choice between a sure outcome and a two-outcome 
risky prospect. Prospects were equally divided into gain, loss, and mixed domains. Subjects in 
the DFE condition were provided with minimal information about the content of the two 
prospects. Importantly, unlike in Glöckner et al. (2016), they do not know the number of 
possible outcomes in prospects. They make a single choice after an exploratory sampling stage. 
The readers are referred to Erev et al. for more details on the experimental design. 
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Results  
The estimation results are in Table 2. The parameter estimations under the DFE condition using 
the diffuse prior replicate the classic DFD-DFE gap. Specifically, the DFE condition indicates 
more likelihood sensitivity compared to the DFD condition. This means that the rare outcomes 
are less overweighted under DFE than under DFD. It should be noted that the underweighting 
of rare events claimed in the early DFE studies is not found here. This happens mainly because 
of the correction of the sampling error by using observed relative frequencies rather than 
unknown objective probabilities. There is no DFD-DFE gap with respect to other prospect 
theory parameters.  
 
Table 2. Estimation results with the data set of Erev et al. (2010) 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. Stars indicate DFD – DFE gap. * 𝑝 <
0.05. ** 𝑝 < 0.01. *** 𝑝 < 0.001.  
 
The estimation results based on context-dependent expectations imply different 
conclusions about the gap depending on the prior assumptions. Under the assumption of 
ignorance prior, the gap is persistent in the gain domain; and insignificant in the loss domain. 
Under the assumption of Carnap prior, the gap is insignificant in the gain domain; and 
significantly reversed in the loss domain. Carnap’s constant 𝑐 is marginally different from 0 
(𝑝=0.078). The estimated 𝑐 = 0.202 means that for the median number of 5 draws, a never-
observed rare outcome receives almost 2% probability. Based on the BIC scores, the Carnap 
prior accounts for the data better than the ignorance prior.  
 DFD DFE DFE DFE 
  
Diffuse Prior 
Ignorance Prior Carnap Prior 
  
Context-
Dependent 
Expectations 
Comprehensive 
Expectations 
Context-
Dependent 
Expectations 
Comprehensive 
Expectations 
𝛼 0.932  0.917  0.720** 0.734** 0.859  0.815  
𝜆 1.111  1.158  1.179 1.145 1.283  1.123  
𝑐 - 0 2 3 0.202  1.038*  
𝛿+ 0.779  0.803  0.670 0.501 0.790  0.512  
𝛾+ 0.599    0.891*  0.925* 0.461 0.795  0.338  
𝛿− 1.167  1.268  1.301 1.565 1.504  1.686  
𝛾− 0.589       0.924**  0.626 0.403 0.265** 0.307  
𝜎 1.055  1.450  2.681** 3.853*  1.874  2.871  
𝑁 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400  
𝐿𝐿 -1313.621 -1202.785 -1270.405 -1204.649 -1191.344 -1189.832 
𝐵𝐼𝐶 2681.724 2460.053 2595.292 2463.781 2444.955 2441.929 
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The estimations based on comprehensive expectations consistently indicate a reversed 
DFD-DFE gap in both the gain and the loss domains, although these are not significant. Under 
the assumption of Carnap prior, the parameter 𝑐 is different from 0 (𝑝 = 0.012). The estimated 
𝑐 = 1.038 means that a never-observed rare outcome receives almost 6% probability for the 
median sample size. As in the case of context-dependent expectations, the Carnap prior 
accounts for the data better than the ignorance prior based on BIC scores. It is also worth noting 
that the significant gap observed in utility functions under the models with ignorance prior 
suggests unwarranted interactions between model parameters under this assumption.  
The models with the Carnap prior account for the data better than the model with diffuse 
prior (𝐵𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑠𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 > 103 for both context-dependent and comprehensive expectations; see 
Wagenmakers, 2007). Comprehensive expectations perform slightly better than context-
dependent expectations. The resulting probability weighting functions with the Carnap prior 
are in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Probability weighting functions from the data set of Erev et al. (2010) 
Notes: Solid black lines show probability weighting under DFD. Dashed blue lines show probability 
weighting under DFE when the diffuse prior is used. Dotted red lines show probability weighting under 
DFE based context dependent expectations. Dot-dash green lines show probability weighting under 
DFE based on comprehensive expectations. 
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Discussion  
DFD-DFE gap 
The weighing of uncertainty under DFE concerns both the probabilistic inference and 
probability weighting. The aforementioned two-stage model gives a refined analysis of 
probability weighting under DFE by modelling probabilistic inference with a rigorous Bayesian 
method of updating. The findings with the two-stage model showed that the rational updating 
of symmetric priors accommodates the commonly found regressive probability estimations, and 
it explains a considerable part of the reversed DFD-DFE gap. The remaining gap is explained 
by the source dependent probability weighting. The reanalysis of the classic DFD-DFE gap 
confirmed the validity of the two-stage model by revealing the persistence of the enhanced 
likelihood insensitivity under DFE, which is consistent with the reversed DFD-DFE gap.  
 There are two possible factors that may give rise to different probability weighting under 
DFD and DFE: sampling experience and ambiguity. Contrary to the reversed DFD-DFE gap, 
previous studies by van de Kuilen & Wakker (2006), van de Kuilen (2009) and Humphrey 
(2006) on experienced risk; and studies by Ert & Trautmann (2014) and Kemel & Travers 
(2016) on experienced ambiguity report that the sampling experience reduces, rather than 
enhances, likelihood insensitivity. While the experienced ambiguity in the present study can 
explain the discrepancy with the former studies on experienced risk, a possible reason for the 
discrepancy with the previous studies on experienced ambiguity can be different methodologies 
used in these studies. Kemel & Travers (2016) uses certainty equivalents of experienced 
prospects, rather than binary choice data, to elicit PT parameters. Therefore, their method 
requires comparisons of experienced prospects with explicitly described certain outcomes. 
Similarly, Ert & Trautmann (2014) focuses on choices between experienced ambiguous 
prospects and described risky prospects. Future research can clarify the impact of sampling 
experience when the choice is between two experienced ambiguous prospects as in Glöckner et 
al. (2016) and Erev et al. (2010). 
The enhanced likelihood insensitivity is a common finding in the ambiguity literature 
(Wakker, 2010, p. 292). This residual deviation from Bayesian rationality can be explained by 
perceived ambiguity in estimated probabilities (Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell, & 
Peijnenburg, 2015). Specifically, acknowledging the uncertainty about his probability 
estimation, the decision maker can consider a range of possible probabilities around his 
estimate. However, the range is very likely to be asymmetric around small probabilities such as 
5% because there is much more room between 5% and 100% than between 0% and 5%. As a 
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result, a decision maker who is weighting the rare outcome with an average of minimum and 
maximum of the perceived range of probabilities – as in the 𝛼 − 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 model (Hurwicz 
1951; Luce & Raiffa 1957) – is likely to assign a weight higher than the small probability 
estimate of 5%. Such multiple prior accounts of ambiguity are common in the behavioral 
economics literature (Baillon, Bleichrodt, Keskin, L'Haridon, & Li , in press; Chateauneuf, 
Eichberger, & Grant, 2007; Ghirardato, Maccheroni, & Marinacci, 2004; Gilboa & Schmeidler, 
1989; Marinacci, 2015). 
 
The Bayesian method of updating 
This paper utilizes a tractable Bayesian updating method in analyzing subjective probabilities 
under DFE. Despite its promising performance in accounting for the previous empirical 
findings, the descriptive validity of the method can be questioned. First, as in any Bayesian 
approach, in Carnap’s method, the strength and the weight of evidence, i.e. 
𝑛𝑖
𝑁
 and 𝑁, are 
combined in a way that they receive equal emphasis in evaluation. Notwithstanding this 
normative property, an influential study by Griffin & Tversky (1992) indicates that people 
systematically focus on the strength of evidence while paying insufficient attention to the 
credibility. This tendency results in either representativeness (overconfidence) or conservatism 
(underconfidence) in probability judgments. A recent study Kvam & Pleskac (2016) replicates 
these findings in an environment where the information is accumulated by observation similar 
to the sampling paradigm.  
Although Carnap’s method cannot differentiate the relative impact of the strength and 
the weight of evidence, biases similar to representativeness and conservatism can still be 
observed by negative values of 𝑐. In particular, −𝑁 < 𝑐 < 0 implies too much updating in the 
direction of sample information resembling to representativeness, and 𝑐 < −𝑁 implies 
improper updating in the direction of prior beliefs resembling to an extreme case of 
conservatism.  
 Second, the Bayesian updating method assumes perfect memory where there is no 
recency effects in probability judgments. Although some early studies report recency effects in 
DFE, the evidence is still mixed in the literature (see the comprehensive meta-analysis by Wulff 
et al. 2016). Nonetheless, there are also ways to capture these effects within the Carnap’s 
formula.  One way is to simply use the sampling information from the second half of the 
observed sequence of outcomes as if the first half is forgotten. Such modelling of recency 
effects is discussed in Ashby & Rakow (2014) and in Wulff & Pachur (2016) (the sliding 
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window model). Another way is to assign different weights to the relative frequencies observed 
in the first and in the second half of the sequence. For example, taking 𝑁1 and 𝑁2, the sample 
sizes of the first and second half the observations with 𝑁1 + 𝑁2 = 𝑁, one can use 𝑁1
′ = 𝑁1 and 
𝑁2
′ = 𝜑𝑁2 where 𝜑 < 1 implies recency.       
Conclusion 
The preceding literature on DFE has extensively argued for the role of sampling error and 
ambiguity in the DFD-DFE gap. This study points to another important factor, being prior 
beliefs. The Bayesian approach, taken as a working hypothesis in this study, is shown to be 
useful in resolving the controversy about the gap by offering a tractable way to analyze prior 
beliefs. Importantly, the DFD-DFE gap is almost fully accommodated when prior beliefs are 
taken into account. The residual gap is explained by perceived ambiguity. Bayesian updating 
does remarkably well in explaining experimental data despite its normative nature. A promising 
topic for future research will concern more descriptive methods for analyzing beliefs under 
DFE.    
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